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THE LIMITED CASE FOR 
DISCRIMINATION’S LEGALITY 
AVIHAY DORFMAN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Antidiscrimination law in market settings is asymmetrically structured.1 
Employers may not discriminate against would-be (and current) employees; no 
obligation of this sort runs in the opposite direction.2 Similar asymmetry holds in 
the housing market as antidiscrimination duties stop when house-seekers 
discriminate against landlords or owners.3 And more generally, some providers 
of goods or services may not be allowed to refuse to serve customers, though the 
latter is at unrestrained liberty to discriminate against these providers.4 
There is nothing inherently problematic in giving horizontal interactions (that 
is, among private persons) an asymmetric cast. Many legal schemes in and around 
market settings feature some such asymmetry—for instance, laws regulating 
disclosure, product safety, and workplace safety focus almost single-mindedly on 
one party in the transaction, to the near exclusion of the other. Information 
asymmetries and power imbalances, more generally, can explain many of these 
cases. Asymmetry in laws governing horizontal interactions can be discerned 
even beyond market settings, as when negligence law, reacting to the normative 
priority of bodily integrity over liberty of action, enforces different standards of 
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 1.  See, e.g., TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 195–214  (2015) 
(asserting that antidiscrimination duties are “typically imposed on the state, on employers on landlords, 
and on providers of goods and services” rather than on employees, tenants, and consumers because the 
“liberty costs and expressive dangers are too high” for the latter group). For more on the structural claim, 
see infra Part II. 
 2.  For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 defines employment discrimination in 
terms of discrimination by an “employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018). 
 3.  See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (f) (2018) (declaring discrimination in 
connection with selling and renting houses illegal). 
 4.  For instance, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits “discrimination or segregation in 
places of public accommodation” but in fact limits this prohibition to discrimination and segregation by 
places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. That is, the Act focuses exclusively on the 
responsibility of sellers, to the exclusion of buyers. See id. § 2000a(b) (listing business establishments and 
commercial bodies serving “the public” as places of public accommodation). 
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due care on risk-creators, on the one hand, and on risk-takers, on the other.5 
What all these, and many other, examples share is the commitment to subjecting 
the terms of private law interactions to a standard of substantive equality—that 
is, the law takes difference seriously and, so, resists treating the interacting parties 
as formally equal. 
What might explain the asymmetric structure of antidiscrimination law in 
market settings? In these pages, I focus on what seems to me to be the more 
challenging prong of this question—why, if at all, should the likes of the 
employees, home-seekers, and consumers be relieved of the antidiscrimination 
duties that typically apply to their counterparties?6 My answer is normative and 
a-historical.7 That is, I look for an explanation of the asymmetric structure of 
antidiscrimination law that is neither a way station toward nor an imperfect 
substitute for a wholly symmetric regime of antidiscrimination law. Put 
affirmatively, I seek to explore what, if anything, could support a liberal legal 
order’s reluctance to impose antidiscrimination duties on the likes of consumers, 
employees, and home-seekers.8 I do that by distinguishing between two different 
ways in which consumers engage in market activities: Transacting bilaterally and 
transacting multilaterally. By bilateral transacting, I mean to refer to a consumer 
deciding whether to buy a particular product from a particular seller at a 
particular time—say, the consumer may consider whether or not to make a one-
off stop at the bookstore on her way back home from work. By contrast, a 
transaction is multilateral in its economic structure when the consumer’s choice 
features a class-wide dimension so that deciding not to purchase from one seller 
is instantly supplanted by a decision to consider buying the thing from another 
seller. Thus, multilateral transactions feature a consumer seeking to buy a 
product from any one of many potential sellers who offer the product for sale—
say, forming a plan to purchase a certain book from any single seller who happens 
to sell this book. I find limited support for the liberal reluctance to impose 
antidiscrimination duties on consumers: Discrimination arising in connection 
 
 5.  See Avihay Dorfman, Negligence and Accommodation, 22 LEGAL THEORY 77, 77 (2016) 
(arguing that “defendants are expected to discharge an objectively fixed amount of care, whereas 
plaintiffs are generally assessed using a subjective measurement of reasonable care”). 
 6.  I take a first stab at the case for imposing antidiscrimination duties on these counterparties 
elsewhere. See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice in Private: Beyond the Rawlsian Framework, 
37 LAW & PHIL. 171, 201 (2018) [hereinafter Dagan & Dorfman, Justice] (arguing that “the justice 
requirement to respect others as substantively free and equal individuals can sometimes be adequately 
discharged only if the relevant private persons are held responsible for its realization”); Hanoch Dagan 
& Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1395–96 (2016) (asserting that the 
private law system should “openly embrace the liberal commitment . . . to substantive equality”). 
 7.  For a penetrating historical account, see generally 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014). I have criticized Ackerman’s account for obscuring the 
(normatively) important distinction between two conceptions of equality that might underlie the civil 
rights revolution—relational and distributional equality. See generally Avihay Dorfman, Discovering 
Private Law: Two Comments on Bruce Ackerman, We The People: The Civil Rights Revolution, 13 
JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 39 (2016). 
 8.  By liberal legal order, I mean laws whose basic commitment is to treat people as free and equal 
persons. 
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with bilateral transacting should not count as a legal wrong. However, the liberal 
case for the legality of discrimination does not apply to multilateral transacting, 
which means that there is no principled basis to relieve consumers engaging in 
the latter market activity of antidiscrimination duties. 
This is a normative argument, as I asserted, but it is normative in a special 
way. Commonly, the study of antidiscrimination law’s asymmetric structure 
proceeds by identifying a fundamental value—for instance, autonomy or 
welfare—followed by an attempt to determine what could be required by a 
commitment to this value within a particular sphere of action (say, in market 
settings or in a certain subset thereof).9 The requirement generated by this 
analysis would then serve as a basis for assessing the current law’s asymmetric 
structure and, in particular, its insistently favorable treatment of the consumer 
side of the interaction. The assumption widely shared by these accounts is that 
the legal and economic forms of market interaction are akin to dependent 
variables in the moral analysis leading up to the recommendation to revise or 
preserve the law in the appropriate way. On this approach, the asymmetry at issue 
is questioned from a purely moral perspective without appreciating that the 
question, and its answer, cannot be understood apart from the legal and the 
economic construction of the moral landscape. By contrast, I argue that the law, 
together with the transaction structures to which it gives rise, construct the moral 
landscape, rather than merely reflect, accommodate, or make it more 
determinate. As a result, the key to assessing the asymmetric structure of 
antidiscrimination law lies in understanding how the law of voluntary 
undertakings with its doctrines of offer and invitation to make offers, along with 
the structure of transactions to which this law gives rise, make a difference in 
moral space. 
The argument proceeds in three stages. Part II sets the scene by explaining 
the sense in which the asymmetry in question is structural. In the course of doing 
so, I seek to deny certain widely accepted explanations of the asymmetry, such as 
those emphasizing that sellers often hold themselves open to the public, that they 
should be seen as quasi-public officials, that they are the Goliaths of the market, 
or that consumers possess a right to do wrong. Part III shows how a certain 
concern for free agency can make some sense of the asymmetric structure of 
antidiscrimination law—more precisely, it develops a liberal case for the legality 
of discrimination in what I call a bilateral transaction structure. Part IV takes up 
the scope of this case—that is, whose free agency trumps the demands of 
antidiscrimination law and under what conditions. 
 
 9.  For a very thoughtful analysis, see Katherine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by 
Customers, 102 IOWA L. REV. 223, 227 (2016), which argues that a commitment to efficiency would 
logically lead to a blanket ban on discrimination by customers, but would ultimately be more inefficient 
and counterproductive. Other important contributions include, among many others, Michael Blake, The 
Discriminating Shopper, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1017 (2006); Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair 
Housing, 97 B.U. L. REV. 349 (2017); Richard H. McAdams, The Need for a General Theory of 
Discrimination: A Comment on Katherine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Customers, 102 
IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 335 (2017). 
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Two methodological points before I begin. First, I develop a liberal case for 
the legality of discrimination in market settings. To do so, I presuppose that these 
settings can be studied in some measure of isolation from other partially 
overlapping social spheres, such as the spheres of intimacy and democratic 
politics. Note that I am not making the strong claim that patterns of 
discrimination in market settings and the legal response to them are, strictly 
speaking, distinctive. After all, the legal institutions that govern market 
interactions, contract and property in particular, also establish non-market forms 
of human interactions (for instance, a private owner who grants permission to 
others, strangers included, to make free-of-charge use of her resource for certain 
recreational purposes). Instead, my discussion presupposes a weaker claim, 
namely, that the market is an especially interesting—and important—sphere of 
interpersonal, voluntary undertakings in modern, liberal-egalitarian societies. 
This general point is reinforced by the challenge of defending asymmetry in 
matters of discrimination in market settings. Indeed, it is one thing to support 
forms of asymmetry in vertical interactions between political authorities and their 
constituents; quite another to make sense of the law’s asymmetrical treatment of 
horizontal interactions, especially when participants on both sides of these 
interactions exhibit (at least sometimes) morally indistinguishable repugnant 
behavior. 
Second, by focusing on antidiscrimination law and its structure, I seek to 
distinguish between “the antidiscrimination law” of this or that polity and 
“antidiscrimination law” as an idea of a legal institution shared, with some 
variations, among all or many liberal legal orders.10 To this extent, I treat 
antidiscrimination law as private-law theorists often approach the subject matter 
of contract, tort, or property. Rather than zooming in on the contract, tort, or 
property law, say, of a particular jurisdiction in a particular time, they assume, 
and indeed reclaim, an idea of—and for—contract, tort, or property. This is not 
to say that there must be an integrated idea of antidiscrimination law. However, 
the asymmetry on which my argument focuses is so overwhelmingly present in 
the legal schemes of many liberal legal orders, described in this Article, as to 
justify a prima facie belief in antidiscrimination law as an idea, or a repository of 
ideas, implicit in these schemes. 
 
II 
SETTING THE SCENE: THE STRUCTURAL BASIS OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION’S 
ASYMMETRY 
In this Part, I seek to explain the sense in which the asymmetry of 
antidiscrimination law is structural. It is structural, I argue, in the sense that it 
abstracts from both the economic conditions of the market and conceptions of a 
 
 10.  Although illiberal legal orders (that is, orders whose basic commitments are at odds with treating 
those subject to them as free and equal persons) may, for some reason, prohibit discrimination in market 
settings, I shall set them aside for the purposes of this Article. 
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good life of (most) market participants. By “economic conditions,” I mean a set 
of factors that define the actual workings of a market in a particular time and 
place. These would include the number, size, and power of the relevant actors, as 
well as the extra-market norms that superimpose on market transactions (such as 
national or religious ethos). By “conceptions of a good life,” I refer to the 
particular ways in which participants integrate their market experience into their 
more general pursuit of meaning. The significance of these two abstractions 
comes to this: The asymmetrical application of antidiscrimination law does not 
reflect, or even loosely track, the most commonly-held views on the empirical 
and normative differences between the interacting parties. This approach leads 
to my argument in Parts III and IV—that the asymmetry in question cannot be 
specified without reference to the legal and economic form of the market 
transaction. And as I show presently, it can be partially justified and partially 
criticized by reference to such formality. 
A. David-and-Goliath Dynamics? 
Singling out consumers or employees for favorable treatment cannot be 
supported by empirical differences between the interacting parties. Market 
interactions are not necessarily—indeed, not even typically—about a David-and-
Goliath rivalry. Many sellers and employers are anything but Goliaths (or any 
other variation on the common law’s categories of common carriers and 
innkeepers); that said, they may still be subject to certain antidiscrimination 
duties.11 Consider, for example, a cafeteria owned by a sole proprietor.12 At the 
same time, consumers and employees are not subject to such duties, regardless of 
their market influence as individuals acting separately or in concert. More 
generally, the asymmetry cuts across familiar distinctions such as the one between 
artificial and natural persons. Accordingly, consumers, employees, and home-
seekers are not relieved of antidiscrimination duties by virtue of their status as 
natural (and private) persons. Indeed, sellers and employers may owe these 
duties even when they possess a similar status. 
B. Is Discrimination Predominantly Harmful to Consumers, Not Sellers? 
This way out rests on historical grounds. I say historical grounds because, in 
principle, the adverse consequences of discriminatory practices can visit either 
side in a market interaction. Discrimination against consumers and employees 
 
 11.  It is true that “small” landlords may be treated more leniently than most other landlords. The 
Mrs. Murphy exception is a case in point, but it seems that the reason for this treatment has to do with 
the reality of co-housing, rather than the landlord’s economic size or market power. See 42 U.S.C. § 
3603(b)(2) (2018) (exempting dwellings occupied by four or less families when the landlord occupies one 
of the units or rooms in the dwelling from antidiscrimination laws applicable in renting or selling 
property). See also Avihay Dorfman, No Exclusion 1, 31 (Nov. 11, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3488149 [https://perma.cc/8GCE-2TV7] (asserting 
that a landlord sharing a small dwelling with a tenant “implicates the parties in forms of intimacy and 
rapport as they literally share a living space”). 
 12.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(2) (subjecting “any . . . cafeteria” to non-discrimination duties). 
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can bring about harmful consequences ranging from economic setbacks, to social 
stigma, to humiliation. However, these and other adverse consequences could 
also result from discrimination against some sellers and employers (including, 
most dramatically, sole proprietors, small firms, and businesses managed by 
members of a minority community). So it has to be a historical observation to the 
effect that consumers (and employees) have been the most immediate victims of 
discrimination. Against the backdrop of this observation, it is not surprising that 
antidiscrimination law identifies sellers (and employers) as the source of the 
problem.13 Or so the historical argument might go. 
However, historical and present cases suggest otherwise. For instance, 
although discrimination against Black people during Jim Crow is often associated 
with White sellers excluding Black consumers, studies show that Black-owned 
businesses fell victim to systemic discrimination by White consumers.14 As the 
influential Black leader W. E. B. Du Bois suspected at the end of the nineteenth 
century, “it is [the] density of Negro population in main that gives the Negro 
business-man his best chance.”15 His suspicion would soon become real as Black-
owned businesses during the early twentieth century had to rely almost 
exclusively on Black clientele in the face of discrimination by White consumers.16 
This is, unfortunately, unsurprising, as the morally repugnant behavior associated 
with discrimination in the market need not run in one particular direction; rather, 
the class of victims of discrimination cuts across the buyer-seller distinction. 
C. Do Service- and Good-Providers Hold Themselves Out as Serving the 
Public?17 
It might be tempting to attribute an egalitarian undertaking to these providers 
and, so, to explain antidiscrimination law in terms of a backup plan in case they 
 
 13.  To be sure, this is not an explanation as to why consumers are not targeted, too. 
 14.  JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-HELP AMONG BLACK AMERICANS: A 
RECONSIDERATION OF RACE AND ECONOMICS 144–45, 147 (1991) (finding that Black-owned businesses 
experienced discrimination by White customers with the enactment of Jim Crow laws). 
 15.  W. E. B. DU BOIS, THE NEGRO IN BUSINESS 7 (1899). 
 16.  See Robert L. Boyd, Demographic Change and Entrepreneurial Occupations: African Americans 
in Northern Cities, 55 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 129, 129 (1996) (asserting that demographic changes led to a 
decline in African American businesses serving White populations and an increase in serving African 
American populations); Martin Ruef & Angelina Grigoryeva, Jim Crow, Ethnic Enclaves, and Status 
Attainment: Occupational Mobility among U.S. Blacks, 1880-1940, 124 AM. J. SOC. 814, 817 (2018) 
(stating that under Jim Crow, Black people had to develop a “group economy” based on their forced 
ethnic enclaves). 
 17.  See generally Joseph William Singer, Property and Sovereignty Imbricated: Why Religion is not 
an Excuse to Discriminate in Public Accommodations, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 519, 542 (2017) 
(noting that “a public accommodation is, by definition, open to the public,” which means that “[p]ublic 
accommodations extend a general invitation to the public to come in and do business” without being able 
to “choose which customers to serve”). But as I argue in Part III, it is not clear that this analysis is 
ultimately right in imputing a “general invitation to the public” to the owner without begging the essential 
question. After all, owners had, and in some places can still have, the legal privilege to decide how 
inclusive their invitation should be. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 97-23-17 (2019). In imputing inclusive 
intentions, Singer’s analysis assumes away the very conflict it purports to explain and resolve. For recent 
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fail to make good on their undertaking. The undertaking at issue is egalitarian in 
the sense that these providers make their facilities all-inclusive. There are two 
ways to understand the argument from an egalitarian undertaking perspective. 
One might be a factual observation about the actions and intentions of actual 
providers. Another might also be a conceptual argument concerning the nature 
of the role occupied by those engaging in the business of service and good 
provision. 
That said, neither the former nor the latter is true. Concerning the factual 
observation, the reality that some providers are motivated by egalitarian 
commitments does not make it the case that service- and good-providers as such 
are so motivated. A better interpretation of why antidiscrimination law exists in 
the first place is that many providers could refuse, and have refused, to adopt an 
egalitarian stance. If anything, it seems that sellers, and buyers, may often be 
motivated not so much by egalitarian commitments but rather by their interest in 
advancing their own well-being, broadly conceived to include material and 
aspirational aspects. Concerning the conceptual understanding of the 
undertaking at issue, the notion that there is a built-in feature of egalitarianism 
in the service- or good-provider context is difficult to sustain. The difficulty lies 
in characterizing the link between egalitarianism and the role of a seller in 
conceptual or foundational (or Platonic) terms.18 It is one thing to say that 
discriminatory serving or selling practices are unjustified; quite another to say 
that they do not count as serving or selling at all. The trouble with discrimination 
by providers is not one of overstepping the role of the provider but rather that of 
(wrongful) discrimination. 
D. Are Service- and Good-Providers Public Entities? 
Another familiar, but ultimately mistaken, distinction is between private and 
public (or quasi-public) entities. The argument to which it gives rise is that 
antidiscrimination law is a creature of public law so that its proper scope of 
application covers only public officials or those who partially act on behalf, or in 
the service, of the public.19 By contrast, a private person is at liberty to pick and 
 
support, on grounds of formal equality, for the egalitarianism underlying commercial practices of offer-
making, see PETER BENSON, JUSTICE IN TRANSACTIONS 466 (2019). 
 18.  Plato’s idea of professionalism underlies his argument as to why the guardians should not have 
private property.  It can support viewing providers as public actors in nature. Cf. Jonny Thakkar, Public 
and Private Ownership in Plato and Aristotle, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON PRIVATIZATION 
(Avihay Dorfman & Alon Harel eds., forthcoming 2021). However, it is not clear whether this argument 
can successfully re-describe commercial providers operating in a liberal society in terms of public officials. 
I do not deny the possibility of redescribing lawyers as public officials (officers of the court or so forth). 
Instead, my skepticism focuses on the possibility of generalizing about commercial providers from the 
special cases of lawyers and physicians. 
 19.  See Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility 2.0 (Mar. 15, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). For an earlier (and different) development of an argument that 
providers of “necessities” owe antidiscrimination duties in virtue of occupying the traditional, common-
law position of public accommodations, see Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public 
Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1292–93 (1996). 
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choose whether to be a party to a commercial or an employment transaction—
this is her freedom of, and from, contract.20 For present purposes, suffice it to say 
that the commercial transactions on which my argument focuses, and to which 
antidiscrimination law applies, concern private entities on either side of the 
commercial or employment transaction; neither entity acts as a public official, 
and both pursue their own (read, private) ends, subject to constraints. 
E. A Legal Right to do Moral Wrong? 
The asymmetry at issue also does not align with familiar substantive 
considerations. In particular, it is false to suppose that antidiscrimination duties 
bear more heavily on the autonomy of the consumer or employee than that of 
the seller or employer. Accordingly, the one-sidedness of antidiscrimination law 
cannot be explained by resort to the consumer’s right to wrong sellers. The 
supposition I reject is two-fold: That the seller’s autonomy interest necessarily, 
or overwhelmingly, comes down to its economic aspects (that is, profit 
maximization); and that the consumer’s or employee’s autonomy interest 
necessarily, or overwhelmingly, encompasses non-economic aspects as well (to 
be sure, for many employees work is indeed irreducible to its economic returns). 
Both parts hold only contingently; neither captures what is necessarily true. 
Certainly, the autonomy interests of some sellers and employers cannot be 
identified with profit maximization only—I suspect that many of them find 
deeper meaning in pursuing a business leadership role, for example. And the 
autonomy interests of consumers and employees need not extend beyond the 
brute economic aspects of consuming a mundane good and getting paid to make 
ends meet, respectively—I suspect that this characterization fits a non-trivial class 
of consumers and employees nowadays. And yet, antidiscrimination law displays 
uncompromising indifference to such intricacies. That is, consumers and 
employees are kept outside the purview of the antidiscrimination duties that their 
counterparties do, with some exceptions, owe them.21 
To conclude, it is not surprising, based on the preceding discussion, that 
contemporary reactions to the asymmetric structure of antidiscrimination law 
range from hostility, to puzzlement, to grudging acceptance.22 This state of affairs 
makes it tempting to look for instrumental and inescapably tentative 
explanations—excuses, really—for distinguishing between parties whose 
discriminatory behavior is deemed wrongful and those whose similarly morally 
repugnant and harmful behavior counts as perfectly legal. For instance, epistemic 
difficulties in proving discrimination by consumers and employees may be argued 
 
 20.  Elsewhere, I argue that both propositions—that commercial entities are quasi-public officials 
and that private persons are necessarily free to discriminate—are false, doctrinally and normatively 
speaking. See Dagan & Dorfman, Justice, supra note 6, at 183. 
 21.  Religion-based discrimination by sellers can, and in many liberal-leaning jurisdictions does, give 
rise to a legal wrongdoing; a similarly motivated discrimination by consumers does not. See 42 U.S.C § 
2000a(a) (prohibiting religious discrimination against consumers). 
 22.  For instance, the sources cited supra note 9 exhibit, at different points, some or all of these 
reactions. 
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as a reason of this purely contingent nature. By contrast, my ambition is to 
consider, on principled grounds, what might justify the asymmetric structure of 
antidiscrimination law. My answer has two parts. On the one hand, in Part III, I 
defend a liberal case for the legality of discrimination by the likes of consumers 
and employees insofar as they make their transactions bilaterally structured. On 
the other, Part IV shows that this case cannot justify relieving consumers and 
employees of antidiscrimination duties insofar as they engage in a multilateral 
transaction structure. 
 
III 
A LIMITED CASE FOR THE LEGALITY OF DISCRIMINATION: FREE AGENCY 
The asymmetric application of antidiscrimination law is independent from the 
economic conditions of the market as well as from the conceptions of the good of 
its participants. However, it is not independent from the transaction structure. In 
particular, it is not independent from the distinction between bilateral and 
multilateral transaction structures. A bilateral structure—consisting of a one-off 
buying decision—explains why a morally repugnant act of discrimination on the 
part of the consumer may not give rise to a legal wrong. I argue that this 
explanation finds its grounds in a basic liberal commitment to recognizing 
persons as free agents. And since it goes to the structure of the interaction, it does 
not turn on the specific conception of the good of either party in the interaction; 
nor does it make essential reference to the actual economic conditions of the 
market in which the parties interact (say, whether or not sellers are economic 
Goliaths and consumers are Davids). As I explain in Part IV, however, the case 
for the legality of discrimination does not hold for consumers engaging in 
multilateral transactions—that is, seeking the purchase of a certain good from 
any one seller. 
I will use consumer-side discrimination as my stock example; in particular, I 
focus on a clear case of discriminatory behavior, racial discrimination, so as to set 
aside considerations that might unnecessarily complicate the discussion.23 The 
analysis and conclusions, however, can be extended (as I suggest in Part IV) to 
 
 23.  By using this case, I can leave for another occasion the question of precisely what forms of 
discriminatory behavior should count as morally and legally wrongful. One aspect of this question is what 
to make of the numerus clausus of protected groups found in many statutory prohibitions on 
discrimination—in particular, does this restriction reflect a foundational commitment to protect a limited 
class of traits and characteristics against discriminatory behavior? Elsewhere I argue this in the negative. 
See generally Dagan & Dorfman, Justice, supra note 6. The restriction is better viewed as reflecting an 
institutional concern: The transition from morality to legality brings rule-of-law considerations into the 
picture. Most importantly, law must provide effective guidance to owners of places of public 
accommodation precisely because they are legally empowered, qua owners, to fix other peoples’ 
normative situations. Resorting to clear categories of protected traits helps to defuse the potentially 
intrusive and demanding aspects of the duty to include. In that, the numerus clausus methodology in and 
around antidiscrimination laws establish an intersubjective frame of reference that is capable of guiding 
participants’ deliberation and behavior by minimizing resort to individualized knowledge and radically 
ad hoc judgments. Id. at 176. 
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the cases of employees and home-seekers engaging in discriminatory behavior.24 
Consider a White supremacist who decides to dine out but returns home upon 
learning that the restaurant he entered was owned and managed by a non-White 
person. There is no other underlying reason for his refusal to dine there other 
than that of plain bigotry—neither the cost of the food nor the quality of the food 
or service plays any role in his decision. 
While the White supremacist’s discriminatory behavior is certainly morally 
repugnant, I argue that it should not count as a legal wrong within a liberal legal 
order. The argument commences with the observation that his behavior lacks a 
wrongful act apart from the immoral motive it exhibits. The outward act of 
refraining from either accepting the owner’s offer or responding to the owner’s 
invitation to make an offer is innocent—offer or invitation to make an offer of 
this sort is non-committal. People may decline, not to mention forgo, this offer or 
invitation to make an offer on any number of perfectly legitimate grounds. They 
may decide that they are no longer interested in dining out, that they cannot 
afford it, that they should rush back home, and so on. This is the sense in which 
the very act of forgoing fails to exhibit genuine wrongfulness. What distinguishes 
the bigot from these other people is, therefore, not the brute act associated with 
declining the offer (or the invitation to make an offer) extended by the restaurant 
owner, but rather his hostile attitude toward the owner’s identity. 
This is not to say that attitudes and motives must always remain beyond the 
reach of liberal legal orders. In fact, liberal legal regimes do, and should, consider 
attitudes and motives insofar as their outward manifestations are illegitimate in 
and of themselves. Liberal legal orders do that, say, in connection with torts such 
as fraud and, most straightforwardly, crimes requiring mens rea. In these 
instances, attitudes and motives figure prominently in the decision to impose 
liability and in determining its appropriate scope.25 But the reason for taking a 
profound interest in illicit attitudes cannot be specified apart from the outwardly 
wrongful acts that accompany these attitudes—for instance, the act inducing 
another person to rely on one’s knowingly false representation can hardly be re-
described as non-wrongful. 
The question I pose is, rather, can attitudes alone serve as a basis for deeming 
a private person’s act of declining an invitation or offer illegal? Conceptually 
speaking, this is surely a possibility all too common in the lived experience of 
totalitarian regimes. There, disloyalty is fundamentally a failure to adopt the right 
attitude toward the ruler—this is why law enforcement agencies in these states 
are often described as thought police (or Thinkpol in George Orwell’s parlance). 
Some religions have advanced a somewhat similar interest in the independent 
 
 24.  See infra Part IV. 
 25.  Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 cmt. c (1977) (noting that an action for 
fraudulent misrepresentation will lie if, among other things, “the actor either acts with the desire to cause 
it or acts believing that there is a substantial certainty that the result will follow from his conduct”), with 
id. § 552 cmt. a (noting that, with respect to negligent misrepresentation, “[w]hen there is no intent to 
deceive but only good faith coupled with negligence, the fault of the maker of the misrepresentation is 
sufficiently less to justify a narrower responsibility for its consequences”). 
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significance of people’s attitudes—the various inquisition campaigns pursued by 
the Catholic Church during the middle ages targeted souls, rather than merely 
outward acts of religious conformity.26 
That said, making attitudes dispositive is not a valid option for a liberal legal 
order.27 Holding a person legally responsible for acquiring morally unacceptable 
motives or attitudes while executing a perfectly legitimate act contrasts with a 
liberal principle of recognizing private persons as free agents. Indeed, imposing 
adverse legal consequences on account of one’s attitude alone undermines free 
agency as it denies the opportunity to act on the basis of a more appropriate 
attitude by revising the current one. 
Note that the opportunity to revise need not be restricted to the act of refusal 
itself (which would reduce the act of revising to that of accepting the restaurant’s 
invitation or offer). Rather, it can also make the same act of refusal accompanied 
by a revised attitude. For instance, our bigot may decide not to order food from 
the restaurant based on a perfectly legitimate reason. In this scenario, his 
disapproving attitude toward the owner’s identity no longer bears on the 
decision—for example, he may refuse based on financial grounds. This view of 
revisability in the domain of motives or attitudes reflects a principled 
commitment on the part of a liberal legal order to recognize people as free agents 
and, so, as persons capable of changing their minds (or attitudes). 
The preceding analysis finds ample support, and further elucidation, in the 
civil and criminal law of some respectable liberal legal orders. For instance, it 
figures prominently in the leading case of Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles.28 There, 
the defendant prevented percolating water from entering the plaintiff’s 
neighboring reservoir in order to force the latter to buy the defendant’s land at a 
high price.29 The court denied liability because malice alone could not render 
legally wrongful a legitimate act of using one’s land to capture percolating 
 
 26.  The Forced Baptism of Jews in Christian Europe: An Introductory Overview, in 
CHRISTIANIZING PEOPLES AND CONVERTING INDIVIDUALS 157, 163 (Guyda Armstrong & Ian N. 
Wood eds., 2000) (noting that “the aim of the Inquisition was to obtain confession, and then to impose 
the appropriate penance in order to reconcile the accused with the church and save their mortal soul”). 
 27.  It may be tempting to read Oliver Wendell Holmes as suggesting that mere malice can figure as 
an independent ground for legal liability. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS 163–67 (2016) 
(interpreting Holmes’s account of malice as being “prima facie wrongful to intend to inflict a loss on 
another person,” therefore leading to the conclusion that, in Ripstein’s view, Holmes asserted that 
actually “causing or intending harm are the basic categories of tort law”). I do not believe that this was 
Holmes’s suggestion, though. Holmes developed the view that harming another person, rather than 
infringing her rights, is what grounds tort liability—he explicitly characterized “temporal damages” as an 
“evil,” and asserted that causing a foreseeable evil triggers liability unless “special grounds” either 
privilege or excuse the injurer. See Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 3, 4–5, 7 (1894). For this reason, Holmes’s analysis of maliciously causing “temporal damage” to 
another person combines morally unacceptable motive with an act causing “evil” consequences. In other 
words, malice does not offer a freestanding reason for the law to impose liability even for Holmes. 
Rather, he invoked it to defeat a privilege the defendant would have had to cause temporal damage had 
he not acted with malice. Roughly speaking, malice was, for Holmes, akin to abuse of a privilege to cause 
evil, rather than a ground of liability. See id. at 9. 
 28.  Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles [1895] A.C. 587 (H.L.). 
 29.  Id. at 595. 
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water.30 But perhaps the most vivid instantiation of the free agency principle 
developed above arises in connection with criminal law, where it is well 
established that the mere “imagination of the mind” is not punishable.31 This 
point is brought home most vividly by criminal law’s doctrine of locus 
poenitentiae, under which mere preparations to engage in a criminal act cannot 
trigger liability: The reason is that the space, the locus, between preparing and 
completing a criminal enterprise reflects the recognition of the actor as a free 
agent and, so, as someone who could—rather than merely would—change his or 
her mind before consummating the crime.32 
One might suspect that the rationale for this principle is, at bottom, purely 
epistemic, picking out the familiar problem of unverifiability. This suspicion is 
not without merits, as many everyday cases of discrimination by consumers occur 
off the legal radar.33 Although at the operational level it can sometimes be 
difficult to ascertain the content of one’s attitudes and their weight in the decision 
to decline an invitation to make offers, the deeper issue is substantive, rather than 
epistemic. Once again, it is about the normative implications—in terms of 
recognizing persons as free agents—of denying people the opportunity to act on 
the basis of more appropriate attitudes by revising the current ones. Hence, 
recognizing what responsible agents could do does not rest on what they would 
do (or even would most likely do).34 Accordingly, the non-epistemic case for 
sustaining an arena of revisability remains firm even in the face of a perfectly 
credible, publicly-conveyed announcement never to enter a transaction with a 
place owned, say, by this or that person.35 
Must a similar analysis apply in the case of the restaurant owner? Not 
necessarily and, typically, not at all. Extending an arena of revisability to the 
discriminating owner opens up only two possible courses of action: The owner 
can either refrain from discrimination or close down his business. 
To see this, I will focus on a simple case featuring a White supremacist 
restaurant owner who refuses to serve a non-White customer in good standing 
during the restaurant’s normal hours of operation. In order not to prejudge the 
 
 30.  Id. What about legal systems that recognize abuse of rights? My (normative) argument is that 
even then it is inappropriate to impose adverse legal consequences under these circumstances because 
doing so denies one the free agency underlying the ability to change one’s mind. 
 31.  Hales v. Petit [1562] 75 Eng. Rep. 387, 397 (C.B. 1562). 
 32.  See R. A. Duff, Criminal Attempts, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
191, 202 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012) (explaining that locus poenitentiae gives reason to “limit the law of 
nonconsummate offenses to ‘last-act’ cases”). 
 33.  On epistemic difficulties of this sort, see IAN AYRES, PRIVATE PREJUDICE? 
UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE ON RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 127–36 (2001). 
 34.  This is true, once again, in the analogous case of criminal law’s distinction between mere 
preparations and criminal acts. A nice illustration is the Spielberg film MINORITY REPORT (20th Century 
Fox 2002). 
 35.  The space of revisability need not be confined to motives or attitudes formed prior to the 
decisive act of refusal. In principle, it may capture a sincere change of motive that occurs after the fact. 
That is, a repugnant motive underlying an otherwise perfectly appropriate act of refusing to rent a 
wedding venue from an owner could, on reflection, be repudiated and supplanted by a legitimate motive 
(say, concerning economic costs or aesthetics). 
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question, the refusal should be considered legal—this may be so if the case 
predated the Civil Rights revolution, because current antidiscrimination law does 
not apply to sole proprietors,36 or simply because there is no such legal obligation 
at all.37 Further suppose that the customer is in good standing in the sense that he 
or she fully complies with all the housekeeping requirements set out by the 
restaurant owner. These requirements are meant to reflect uncontroversial 
prerequisites such as not violating the (morally sound) criminal law, treating the 
restaurant’s employees and other customers with appropriate respect, and so on. 
Normal hours of operation are just another housekeeping rule. Properly 
conceived, housekeeping requirements exclude non-conforming customers on 
uncontroversial grounds in the sense that they do not, in fact, sustain 
impermissible exclusionary rules (say, enforcing a particular dress code may 
indirectly but effectively, and illegitimately, target certain populations).38 
Against this background, the restaurant owner’s refusal does not leave a 
critical gap between the act and its underlying motive or attitude. The outward 
act of not inviting one class of people to dine cannot be a surface manifestation 
of perfectly legitimate grounds. Rather, it is an act of racial discrimination against 
them. The reason why this case cannot reasonably be re-described to reflect a 
legitimate attitude is that the restaurant owner has already expressed and acted 
on his commitment to inviting people, including strangers who do not share the 
owner’s bigotry, to trade with him. His undertaking makes the act of refusing to 
trade with non-White people the unequivocal upshot of hostile motives or 
attitudes. It precludes the possibility of attributing the refusal to serve non-White 
people to considerations that arise independently of his hostility toward dealing 
with these people.39 That is, his undertaking eliminates the arena of revisability 
since there is no non-hostile motive that could correspond with his decision to 
refrain from serving Black people.40 Instead, he can either invite the latter to dine 
or shun service entirely. 
To be sure, my analysis does not turn on whether the owner’s voluntary 
undertaking takes the form of an offer, which would mean that the owner 
 
 36.  Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not distinguish between sole-proprietors and 
corporations for the purpose of determining what a place of public accommodation is. However, it does 
not seem to subject retailers (say, as opposed to hotels, restaurants, and cafeterias) to the Act’s purview. 
See 42 U.S.C § 2000a(b)(1)–(4) (2018); Singer, supra note 19, at 1288 (stating that “retail stores, after the 
Civil War, were not thought to be public accommodations”). 
 37.  The latter is currently upheld by Mississippi law. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-23-17 (2019). See also 
Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 711, 716 (S.D. Miss. 2016) (holding that Miss. H.B. 1523 (2016) is 
unconstitutional), rev’d on other grounds, 860 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2017) (finding no standing). 
 38.  See also Fair Housing Act, 45 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) (2018) (“Nothing in this subsection requires 
that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the 
health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the 
property of others.”) 
 39.  To be sure, whether or not these considerations count as legitimate depends on their correct 
characterization, rather than on the owner’s subjective view of them. 
 40.  By saying no non-hostile motive, I include motives that are facially neutral but that, in truth, 
conceal hostile ones. 
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undertakes to defer to the discretionary right of customers to accept that offer. 
In some commercial cases, the undertaking at issue takes the form of offering the 
goods or services for sale, in which case a customer is entitled to bind the owner 
to a contract by accepting the offer. However, under the appropriate context, 
some commercial undertakings are better seen as instances of inviting customers 
to make offers, in which case the owner reserves the right to accept (or decline) 
the deal. Nothing in my argument turns on the context-driven distinction between 
an offer and invitation to treat or trade. For even a restaurant owner whose act 
takes the form of inviting cannot reasonably re-describe the refusal of all and only 
offers made by non-White people as exhibiting non-hostile motives or attitudes. 
That is, his undertaking ultimately to transact with everyone except for non-
Whites precludes the possibility of driving a wedge between the act of refusing to 
deal with non-White people and the hostile attitude toward dealing with them. 
 
IV 
ELABORATION: ON THE SCOPE OF THE FREE AGENCY CASE 
I now wish to move from the paradigm case of consumer discrimination to the 
more general characterization of the liberal case for the legality of discrimination 
in the market context. In particular, the argument going forward addresses two 
basic questions: First, what might generate the different implications of 
discrimination made by consumers, on the one hand, and by providers, on the 
other; and second, what is the scope of the liberal case for discrimination’s 
legality, by which I mean who should be relieved of antidiscrimination duties? 
These two questions are intimately related so that the answer to the former 
informs, in some measure, the answer to the latter. 
The discussion in the preceding Part answers the first question. Again, the 
structure of the interaction is the source of the difference between the legal 
implications of consumer discrimination vis-à-vis provider discrimination. The 
key inquiry is whether one’s transactional undertaking eliminates the gap 
between an act and its accompanying attitude so that a subsequent refusal to 
interact unequivocally manifests a hostile attitude. The undertaking at issue, 
recall, can take the form of making an offer, though even an invitation to make 
an offer suffices. On this analysis, the commercial engagement between the 
consumer and the provider need not feature equally situated parties: The 
provider has formed intentions to engage in some commercial dealings with 
certain buyers; however, unlike the consumer, the provider has also specifically 
acted on these intentions by making or inviting offers. This asymmetry in 
consumer–provider interaction matters because the free agency of the former, 
rather than the latter, is at stake. Whereas the consumer can revise the hostile 
attitude underlying her refusal to interact with the other party, the provider may 
not. Deeming the consumer’s refusal legally wrongful fails to recognize her as a 
free agent, that is, as a person capable of acting on the basis of a revised, non-
hostile attitude. 
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A. Limiting and Extending the Scope of the Case 
Characterizing the asymmetry between the consumer and the retailer in terms 
of the structure of their interaction provides the normative resources with which 
to answer the second question concerning the scope of the case for the legality of 
discrimination. Two propositions follow from identifying the structure of the 
interaction as key: First, that the case for the legality of discrimination does not 
apply to all cases of consumer discrimination; and second, that this case could 
apply not only to consumer markets but also, under the appropriate 
circumstances, to transactions in employment and housing markets.41 Hence, the 
analysis of the stock example of consumer–provider interaction should be limited 
to a certain kind of discrimination by consumers but, at the same time, extended 
beyond the category of consumers, or even buyers, to capture other market actors 
whose acts of refusing to engage in certain transactions could admit of non-hostile 
attitudes toward their transactees. I take each of these claims in turn. 
1. Bilateral and Multilateral Transaction Structures: A Limitation 
The free agency case for the legality of discrimination turns on the existence 
of an arena of revisability in the domain of attitudes. The scope of this case should 
therefore track this arena’s existence. I argue that a certain distinction between 
bilateral and multilateral transaction structures determines the existence 
question and, therefore, also the scope of the case of discrimination’s legality. A 
transaction has a bilateral structure for the consumer when it features a one-off 
plan to purchase a thing. Its bilaterality reflects the fact that the consumer’s plan 
comes down to a choice between, on the one hand, purchasing that thing here 
and now and, on the other, forgoing the purchase. That, recall, was my stock 
example in Part III—a White supremacist who returns to his home upon learning 
that the restaurant he has just entered is owned by a non-White person. By 
contrast, a transaction is multilateral in its structure when the consumer’s choice 
features a class-wide dimension so that deciding not to purchase from one seller 
is immediately supplanted by a decision to consider buying the thing from 
another seller. Thus, the consumer’s plan involves choosing among providers of 
a thing, rather than merely whether or not to have this thing.42 Thus, the White 
supremacist would not merely forgo dining out, but rather find an alternative 
restaurant that better suits his racist preferences.43 
What is the significance of the bilateral–multilateral distinction? Most 
importantly, it places a principled constraint on the free agency argument for 
discrimination’s legality. An arena of revisability works if, and only if, consumers 
 
 41.  My present discussion is limited to commercial interactions only. It is possible, I believe, to 
extend the analysis to certain non-commercial interpersonal interactions as well. I leave this possibility 
to another occasion. 
 42.  It should be clear by now that my talk of bilateral and multilateral transaction structures 
concerns economic, rather than juridical or legal, forms. 
 43.  I shall assume that those engaging in the business of selling and employing typically structure 
their transactions multilaterally—as I argue below, this assumption need not hold with respect to 
consumers, employees, and house-seekers. 
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adopt a bilateral transaction structure. That is, the outward act of refusing to buy 
does not necessarily presuppose an underlying illicit attitude. A free agent could 
so act on the basis of a revised attitude, including, in particular, a non-illicit one. 
By contrast, no such arena of revisability works when consumers adopt a 
multilateral transaction structure. There, the act of refusing to transact, say, with 
one provider of a generic good, becomes the unequivocal manifestation of an 
illicit attitude toward him or her. Buying the same good from another, otherwise 
identical provider eliminates the possibility of justifying the refusal to buy from 
the former on legitimate grounds.44 Hence, the argument from free agency cannot 
make good on discrimination that arises in the course of engaging in transactions 
of a multilateral structure. By implication, relieving consumers of 
antidiscrimination duties under these circumstances should be understood as 
resting on instrumental and, so, necessarily contingent arguments. Contrary to 
the bilateral transaction structure, its multilateral counterpart could provide no 
more than a conditional protection from the demands of antidiscrimination law. 
For instance, if the difficulty of verifying consumer discrimination explains 
current reluctance to impose liability, then no such reluctance is warranted when 
the epistemic difficulty at issue becomes sufficiently negligible (as when 
consumers, home-seekers, or employees make their market choices based on a 
smart phones apps’ built-in discriminatory characteristics).45 
Deploying the bilateral–multilateral distinction to determine the scope of the 
free agency case for discrimination’s legality generates an implementation 
challenge. The challenge is one of making antidiscrimination law adequately 
responsive to the normative implications of distinguishing bilateral from 
multilateral transaction structures. And it is anything but straightforward. An 
adequate response will have to resist ad hoc implementation of the bilateral–
multilateral distinction without thereby obscuring it. Ad hoc implementation 
should be resisted because it undermines some of the rule-of-law’s values, such 
as guidance. Adopting the opposite extreme of ignoring the difference between 
bilateral and multilateral transaction structures fares no better as it undermines 
the very distinction at issue. Indeed, the bilateral–multilateral distinction leads to 
contrasting normative judgments concerning the legality and illegality of 
discrimination, respectively. Treating all instances of consumer discrimination as 
either legal or illegal necessarily fails to appreciate the argument for free agency 
and its limit. Both transaction structures figure prominently in the lived 
experience of consumers, so there is no reason to marginalize either one. 
Certainly, multilateral transaction structures are ubiquitous. So too are bilateral 
ones. Indeed, consumers often find themselves contemplating a one-off 
 
 44.  The situation I consider in the main text is one in which the consumer’s sole motivation for 
refusal is illicit one. I set to one side both in-between cases of mixed motives (involving illicit and non-
illicit ones) and non-discriminatory cases (involving purely legitimate reasons to prefer purchasing from 
one provider than the other). 
 45.  For more on the growing resort to apps (and other online tools) and their discriminatory 
implications in the housing markets context, see Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair Housing, 97 B.U. 
L. REV. 349, 403–06 (2017). 
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transaction (say, going on a shopping spree); home-seekers may sometimes 
pursue their one and only dream house; some job-seekers may be willing to give 
up the independence of self-employment for the sake of joining a specific firm. 
Against this backdrop, the argument for free agency supports a bifurcated 
antidiscrimination law. The organizing question is not an all-or-nothing one 
concerning whether consumers should owe, or be relieved of, antidiscrimination 
duties. Rather, because they should sometimes owe and at other times be relieved 
of these duties, the live question—the challenge mentioned above—is how to 
implement this dualism in the practice of antidiscrimination law. I leave this 
challenging question to another occasion. 
This way of identifying what might be the (limited) case for discrimination’s 
legality should be contrasted with the autonomy-based argument for and against 
relieving consumers of antidiscrimination duties. The key distinction of the free-
agency account I have been developing in these pages is a formal one, as it 
concerns the difference between bilateral and multilateral transaction structures. 
By contrast, the autonomy-based case for the legality (or illegality) of 
discrimination turns on the substantive distinction between transactions based on 
their contribution to the participant’s autonomy—for example, the identity of a 
generic goods provider may have very little impact on the autonomy of the buyer 
and, so, makes no compelling case for relieving the latter of antidiscrimination 
duties. This approach confronts a very difficult challenge, though: It is not clear 
how autonomy can launder a morally wrongful discrimination in a market setting 
simply by saying that doing wrong proves very beneficial to the wrongdoer’s 
autonomy. The free-agency case that I prefer faces no such difficulty as it appeals 
to a more fundamental concern about law’s impact on freedom and 
responsibility—liberalism’s commitment to respecting the basic capacity to 
change one’s mind. 
2. Asymmetry in Reverse Order: An Extension 
Because it is grounded in a concern for free agency, the limited case for the 
legality of discrimination need not single out consumers or buyers whose 
transactions are bilaterally structured. The labor market can render this point 
more vivid: Discrimination by “sellers” of labor does not count as illegal, whereas 
discrimination by its “buyers” is typically deemed legally wrongful.46 To be sure, 
I do not suggest that buying labor is the exact same commercial activity, say, as 
purchasing commodities and services. Rather, I assume that the formal 
similarities are substantial enough to characterize recruiting practices as in some 
measure instances of buying labor. 
Now consider the case of an employer inviting potential candidates to make 
employment offers or making employment offers to candidates. Either way, a 
decision to make the invitation or offer only to White people implicates the 
employer in the same situation in which the restaurant owner, acting as a seller, 
is willing to make commercial transactions with everyone save for non-White 
 
 46.  E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2018). 
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consumers. The employer’s refusal to hire certain people on account of their race 
does not leave a critical gap between this act and its underlying hostile attitude. 
That is, the discriminatory act cannot be a surface manifestation of perfectly 
legitimate grounds. Rather, it is an act of racial discrimination against potential 
candidates. The only ways for the employer to revise his or her hostile attitude 
are to either treat Black candidates with equal respect or refrain from hiring new 
employees entirely.47 On this account, prohibiting discrimination by employers 
does not undermine the law’s respect for the free agency of the employer. 
On the other hand, the gap between an employee’s hostile attitude toward 
Black employers and his ultimate act of declining the invitation made by these 
employers may sometimes parallel the bilateral transaction structure of the 
White supremacist consumer facing a one-off choice concerning dining out at a 
restaurant owned by a Black person. The parallel in question does not concern 
simultaneous submissions of job applications to multiple employers, which is to 
say a multilateral transaction structure. Rather, it concerns a one-off attempt at 
getting a job offer from a particular firm (because only employment in this firm 
can be as attractive as self-employment, it is the only firm in the candidate’s field 
of expertise, or any other reason motivating a bilateral transaction structure). 
Against this backdrop, declining the employer’s invitation can be a manifestation 
of any number of non-hostile attitudes, which means that the employee could 
act—accept or decline the Black employer’s invitation or offer—on the basis of 
a more appropriate attitude by revising the hostile one. Hence, respect for this 
employee’s free agency requires the existence of an arena of revisability; it 
supports the legality of discrimination by employees. 
The case of employment-related discrimination shows, among other things, 
that the legality of discrimination does not turn on occupying the role of the 
buyer—employers are not, and should not, be relieved of general 
antidiscrimination duties. This conclusion is not peculiar to labor markets, to be 
sure. Indeed, it can be replicated in markets for goods or services. Begin with a 
concrete case: competitive bidding for services. There, the buyer of goods or 
services invites offers from various manufacturers, distributors, or service-
provides (who occupy the positions of potential sellers, in which case it is the 
buyer who gets to decide whose offer merits acceptance). The asymmetric 
structure in such situations puts the auctioneer-buyer in a position similar to 
those of the restaurant owner and the employer. By undertaking to invite bids 
from non-Black service providers, the buyer makes its act of restricting the 
invitation an unequivocal outward manifestation of a hostile attitude toward 
Black people. And in contrast, a service-provider declining on racist grounds to 
take the bid could keep himself off the bid, but this time on the basis of a revised, 
legitimate motive. 
The example of competitive bidding can be generalized so as to explain the 
broader category of firms making buying offers to, or inviting buying offers from, 
 
 47.  Treating these candidates with respect is not inconsistent with setting uncontroversial 
housekeeping rules, say, against hiring unqualified workers. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
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potential sellers. Take, for instance, a car dealer who offers to buy cars from 
vehicle owners, including past clients. The dealer’s role in such a transaction can 
be characterized as a buyer, whereas the car owner, who is typically a private 
person, occupies the role of the seller. Suppose the car dealer reaches out with 
such an offer, or an invitation to make an offer, but declines to extend it, say, to 
potential sellers with qualifying vehicles based solely on their race. At the same 
time, consider a potential seller (or a seller class) who refuses to accept the offer 
or the invitation based on identical repugnant reasons (which would be the race 
of the owner or manager of the dealership). On my analysis, the buyer’s 
discriminatory behavior is properly considered legally, not just morally, 
wrongful—this is because there is no way for the car dealer to act on the basis of 
a non-hostile attitude other than by either eliminating the racist components in 
the buy-back program or eliminating the program entirely. By contrast, consider 
the circumstances of the car owner, the would-be seller, insofar as he or she is 
facing a bilateral transaction structure involving a one-off opportunity for a sell-
back. Under these circumstances, a car owner may refuse the offer for any 
number of legitimate reasons, which means that this owner could, regardless of 
whether he or she would, in fact, change his or her mind and act on the basis of a 
non-hostile attitude toward the buyer’s race. Deeming the car owner’s immoral 
behavior illegal necessarily fails to recognize him or her as a free agent in 
precisely this way. 
B. Discrimination, Artificial Persons, and Free Agency 
The argument has so far sought to explain the asymmetric framework of 
antidiscrimination law by uncovering a hitherto overlooked connection between 
the structure of market interactions and a certain concern for the free agency of 
the interacting parties. From this connection, an important question arises with 
respect to the scope of the case for the legality of discrimination: Does it cover 
incorporated persons? To start, the analysis has been sufficiently formal and 
abstract to accommodate the existence of non-natural market actors of all sorts, 
be they buyers or sellers, employers or employees, and so on. Indeed, my focus 
on the structure of the interaction makes it conceptually possible to conceive of 
either party to an interaction as an incorporated person. That said, the normative 
significance of this approach lies in considerations of free agency—more 
specifically, that the legal order recognizes the capacity of the parties to manifest 
their free agency in the world by revising their attitudes in response to the 
demands of the right reason. One might suspect that incorporated persons are far 
removed from these considerations or that they are only loosely and indirectly 
implicated by such innate capacity. This is because, the objection could go, an 
organization does not acquire attitudes or motives of its own and, so, does not 
call for an arena of revisability. 
It might be protested that a corporation’s discriminatory decision, say, to 
refrain from purchasing goods or services from a certain person is not a decision 
made purely by an artificial person. As an empirical matter, the corporation’s 
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agents who are entitled to speak and act in its name are the ones behind the 
decision and, for this purpose, adopt attitudes and motives that characterize such 
a decision. Normatively, treating corporations as purely artificial constructs, to 
the exclusion of the moral agents who own, run, and work for them, is 
counterintuitive at least from a liberal (as opposed to a utilitarian) point of view. 
Accordingly, considerations of free agency need not wither away when natural 
persons, occupying the roles of owners, managers, and workers, speak and act in 
the name of a corporation. 
That said, the nature of the connection between organizations and the idea of 
agency (properly conceived) remains unclear. Furthermore, addressing it 
presupposes an elaborate theory of incorporated persons and the precise 
connection between them and the natural persons who function as their owners, 
managers, and workers—for instance, should this connection be viewed in terms 
of incorporated persons extending the agency of natural persons and, if so, in 
what ways and to what extent? These complex questions must be addressed 
before we can determine whether or not incorporated persons fall within the 
scope of the free-agency case for the legality of discrimination. 
 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The limited liberal case for the legality of discrimination discussed in these 
pages identifies an important connection between the asymmetric structure of 
antidiscrimination law and the capacity for free agency, which is part of what it 
means for a liberal legal order to respect its constituents, taken separately, as free 
and equal agents. It is perhaps plausible to suppose that in a world in which both 
sides of every market transaction are subject to antidiscrimination duties, the 
chances of suffering discrimination would be lower than in our world in which 
these duties fall only one-sidedly. This would not be the only important 
divergence between the two worlds, though. In the world with less discrimination, 
no one is treated by the law (of antidiscrimination) as an agent capable of acting 
on the basis of a revised attitude by responding to the demands of right reason in 
a way in which, in our world, everyone holds an entitlement to be treated as such. 
